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ABSTRACT

Dominika Kleinova: A Comparative Analysis Of The Factors Determining The Immigration
Policies Of Germany And Hungary
(Under the direction of Shailja Sharma)

Currently, the European Union struggles to deliver a united response to the immigration
issue. In order to bring forth a framework for its improvement, it is important to consider the
reasons for individual member states’ behaviors. This study attempts to examine the factors
influencing the immigration policies of Germany and Hungary, whose policies appear to differ
the greatest and should thus encompass most of the spectrum a majority of other member states
fall under. The thesis will describe the effect of the economy, history, previous contact with
foreigners, shaping of national identity, as well as education on the populations’ attitudes
towards immigrants and the countries’ policies. This study concludes that all these factors are
essential for understanding the countries’ immigration policies and should be considered when
constructing common European asylum and immigration policies.
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Introduction
With deeper integration of the European Union, its bodies have moved away from
considering the uniqueness of each country when constructing common policies. Moreover, the
EU member states are expected to adapt to these policies, eventually leading to a fusion resulting
in one sovereign governing body. However, the EU states are far from being willing or able to
forget their differences. This can be seen on the most recent challenge that the EU faces – the
inflow of refugees from the Middle East, especially Syria. The current Syrian refugee crisis is
considered to be the greatest mass movement of people since the Second World War.1 The civil
war between the President al-Assad’s regime and the opposition has been taking place since
2011 when the first 50,000 Syrians fled to Lebanon. Displaced Syrians have found themselves in
refugee camps in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. Besides the Syrian civil war, the threat of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) contributes to the rising number of refugees from the
Middle East. These refugees have been crossing the Mediterranean to seek refuge in Europe (for
the most part in Germany) and, eventually, the USA since 2015. A unified response from the EU
on how to deal with these immigrants is most essential. When it comes to this challenge, the EU
is divided on policies towards amending the crisis. Each country handles the inflow of refugees
very differently.
It is therefore important to address how the countries’ attitudes towards immigrants
differ. Through a comparative analysis of Germany and Hungary, I claim that history, economy,
and culture are the main factors directing the behavior of EU countries in regards to immigration.
Considering the uniqueness of each factor on the specific country leads to a better understanding
and can improve the European Common Immigration and Asylum policy. This thesis analyzes
“The EU and the Refugee Crisis,” European Commission, last modified July 2016, accessed June 12, 2017,
http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/refugee-crisis/en/.
1
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the differences between German and Hungarian immigration policies from economic, historical,
and cultural points of view in order to provide a critique of the EU immigration and asylum
system. Moreover, this should stress the importance of considering each country’s history,
economy, and culture when constructing policies.
Before addressing the determinants of countries’ behaviors towards immigrants, it is
important to understand the asylum and immigration system of the whole EU. The first chapter,
therefore, provides an overview of the EU Common Asylum and Immigration Policy and its
shortcomings. In the second chapter, the focus shifts towards the impact of history and economy
on German and Hungarian attitudes and immigration policies. The third chapter analyzes public
attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. These attitudes are explained in the fourth chapter
through contact theory, quality of education, and notions of identity in each country. In the fifth
chapter, suggestions are presented on how to facilitate closer cooperation within the EU in the
field of immigration.
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Chapter 1: EU Common Asylum and Immigration Policy
As a supranational organization, the EU faces the challenge of determining the extent of a
member states’ obligations to the organization. The Schengen Area, created by the Schengen
Agreement2, is based on the obligation that most of the EU member states (plus Norway and
Iceland) abandon border controls, which results in a loss of control over migration flows to and
from these countries. On the other side, however, the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty established the
‘Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,’ in which member states are required to provide
protection to third-country nationals (TCNs).3 Azoulai and de Vries argue that the abolition of
internal boundaries on the one hand, and the responsibility of member states to ensure fair
treatment of TCNs (monitored by the EU, which has the right to act if these rights are violated)
on the other hand, “is likely to generate tensions within the structure of EU migration law.”4
Moreover, the integration of asylum and immigration policies has not been an easy task
because most member states have been signatories to international conventions related to
refugees for decades5 and have exercised their own policies towards refugees and immigrants.
However, Collett points to a connection between the immigration system and the economy when
she claims that defining immigration, integration, and asylum policies directly impacts the EU’s
economic competitiveness.6 It can then be claimed that as the EU’s level of economic and
political integration increases, it is necessary to create a common asylum system in order to keep
these shifts from failing.
2

The Schengen Agreement became effective in 1995. Today it is a part of a larger body of rules that must be
implemented by every EU member state.
3
Third-country national is an individual whose nationality is different from the host country.
4
Loic Azoulai and Karin de Vries, introduction to EU Migration Law: Legal Complexities and Political Rationales,
ed. Loic Azoulai and Karin de Vries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4.
5
The first document establishing the responsibilities of states to provide protection to refugees, 1951 Geneva
Convention on the protection of refugees, has been signed in 1951 by almost all EU member states.
6
Elizabeth Collett, “Facing 2020: developing a new European agenda for immigration and asylum policy,”
Migration Policy Institute Europe no. 1 (February 2013), accessed January 31, 2016,
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPIEurope-Facing2020.pdf.
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a) Historical development of the EU immigration and asylum policy
The first phase of the common asylum system started with a session of the European
Council in Tampere in 1999. During the session, the European Council adopted a five-year
towards a common European asylum system and a joint European immigration policy. The
European Council adopted basic harmonizing policies and created institutions such as the
European Refugee Fund.7
After the first phase, followed by a reflection phase, the European Commission
introduced three pillars that create the Common European Asylum System: increased
harmonization of the states’ immigration policies, increased cooperation among member states,
and increased solidarity and sense of responsibility within the EU as well as between the EU and
non-members.
b) Current EU immigration and asylum policy
Today, the following rules have been generally agreed on regarding refugee protection
and are being used while dealing with the current refugees: the revised Asylum Procedures
Directive, the revised Reception Conditions Directive, the revised Qualification Directive, the
revised Dublin Regulation, and the revised EURODAC Regulation.8
i) The revised Asylum Procedures Directive (2015)9
The 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive sets out rules for applying for asylum; however,
it has been argued that these rules are too vague and not sufficiently enforced. The European
Commission claims that the revised Asylum Procedures Directive (2015) sets out clearer rules

7

The European Refugee Fund provides financial support to EU member states in dealing with people seeking
protection.
8
“Common European Asylum System,” European Commission, last modified June 23, 2015, accessed February 12,
2016, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm.
9
The European Commission has proposed a new Asylum Procedures Directive as part of the Common European
Asylum System in July 2016. However, the new Directive has not been approved yet.
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and fosters faster and more efficient procedures and asylum decisions, limiting their periods of
time to six months. According to the European Commission, “the new Asylum Procedures
Directive is much more precise. It creates a coherent system, which ensures that asylum
decisions are made more efficiently and fairly, and that all Member States examine applications
with a common high quality standard.”10
ii)

The revised Reception Conditions Directive (2013)
The revised Reception Conditions Directive is the first directive setting out detailed rules

for the detention of asylum seekers (which should only be used as a last resort) in conjunction
with respecting their fundamental rights. By establishing a list of detention grounds, limiting the
time of detentions, establishing restricted cases, and providing legal assistance, the directive
protects the rights of asylum seekers. This directive also ensures common living standards for
applicants and establishes the maximum time period for decisions regarding access to
employment for an asylum seeker.11
iii)

The revised Qualification Directive (2011)
The revised Qualification Directive specifies who qualifies for protection, determines the

scope of protection, and provides integration measures for refugees granted asylum. The
directive provides an important step towards a common asylum policy because it harmonizes the
criteria for providing protection throughout the EU (the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland
are exceptions and are not bound by this directive).12

“Asylum Procedures,” European Commission, last modified February 2, 2016, accessed February 12, 2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/common-procedures/index_en.htm.
11
“Reception Conditions,” European Commission, last modified June 26, 2015, accessed February 12, 2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/reception-conditions/index_en.htm.
12
“Qualification Directive,” European Council on Refugees and Exiles, last modified February 14, 2014, accessed
February 15, 2016, http://ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/92-qualification-directive.html.
10
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iv)

Dublin Regulations (2014)
As a predecessor to Tampere, the Dublin Convention of 1990 is considered to be the first

step towards a common asylum policy within the EU. This convention determined a state, which
was responsible for asylum examination and prevented multiple asylum applications in multiple
EU states, allowing for effective and speedy access to asylum procedures. The rules for the
application of the 1990 Dublin Convention are further laid out in 2003 Dublin Regulation
(Regulation (EC) No. 1560/2003), amended by 2014 Dublin Regulation (Regulation (EC) No.
118/2014), entered into force in 2013, and applied to asylum application as of 2014. Moreover,
the 2013 Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 603/2013) establishes a system for the comparison of
fingerprints – Eurodac. According to European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the regulation
“contains improved procedural safeguards such as the right to information, personal interview,
and access to remedies as well as a mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis
management.”13
v)

The revised EURODAC Regulation (2015)
The revised EURODAC Regulation allows national governments to access the central

EU fingerprint database of asylum seekers in order to prevent crimes of terrorism and improve
investigation procedures. In addition, the regulation imposes time limits on collection and
transmission of fingerprints in order to prevent delays regarding data processing and improve
measures related to data protection.14

“Dublin Regulation,” European Council on Refugees and Exiles, last modified February 14, 2014, accessed
February 15, 2016, http://ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/10-dublin-regulation.html.
14
“Eurodac Regulation,” European Migration Network, last updated 2016, accessed February 3, 2016,
http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/eurodacupdate_oktober_2013.pdf.
13
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vi)

Frontex – EU border protection agency
Frontex is an agency first established in 2004 as the European Agency for the

Management of the Operative Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
European Union, and replaced in 2016 by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The
main purpose of Frontex is to protect the EU borders from illegal immigration. According to its
official webpage, “Frontex promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in
line with the EU fundamental rights charter applying the concept of Integrated Border
Management.”15 Frontex has been helping to manage the refugee crisis by speeding up
deportations and deploying crews to the middle of the Mediterranean, rescuing about 900
migrants stranded in the water during the bad winter weather.16
vii)

Solidarity and responsibility principle
In addition to the above directives and regulations, the European Commission has taken a

number of long-term actions to maintain the balance between solidarity within the EU and a
sense of responsibility in terms of assisting member states in the implementation of the common
asylum system.
In regards to assuming responsibility, the European Commission has been assisting
member states in the application of the EU’s common asylum policies in three ways: firstly, the
European Commission has published guidelines that set out the best approach for fingerprinting
new refugees so that it is more effective. Secondly, the Commission has proposed a regulation
establishing a list of ‘safe’ countries as a part of EU legislation helping the member states to
fight against abuses of asylum policy and facilitate quick returns to the country of origin. Lastly,
“Mission and Tasks,” Frontex, last updated 2016, accessed March 2, 2016, http://frontex.europa.eu/aboutfrontex/mission-and-tasks/.
16
“Migrant Crisis: EU patrol ship saves 900 migrants off Greece,” BBC News, February 18, 2016, accessed March
1, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35609815.
15
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the Commission has taken responsibility for monitoring the implementation of these
mechanisms.
Besides assuming responsibility, the Commission is also executing the solidarity
mechanism in multiple ways. The Commission is providing funding for migration and security
challenges; in 2015, the Commission provided over €8.4 billion to this purpose. In addition to the
funding, the Commission is assisting in the relocation and resettlement of refugees by providing
foundational recommendations for resettlement plans to be adopted by the member states. The
Commission is also sending migration management support teams to aid national authorities.
Among these teams is the Civil Protection Mechanism, which was created to provide
humanitarian assistance in emergency situations. This humanitarian assistance includes
“providing tents, sleeping bags and bedding, personal protective items, heating and lighting
equipment, and electricity generators.”17 Currently, humanitarian assistance is still active in four
member states: Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Greece.
c) Shortcomings of the current EU asylum policy
Although the Commission assists member states in many areas in dealing with refugees,
its report states that “there are requests for assistance from Member States, which remain
outstanding.”18 This means that although the Commission provides a number of supportive
actions, these actions do not meet the needs of member states. Currently, there are 70
infringement cases that include violations of the instruments of the Common European Asylum
System (see Table 1).

“Managing the Refugee Crisis: Balancing Responsibility and Solidarity on Migration and Asylum,” European
Commission, accessed February 12, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/europeanagenda-migration/backgroundinformation/docs/balancing_responsibility_and_solidarity_on_migration_and_asylum_20160210_en.pdf, 2.
18
Ibid.
17
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Table 1: Open Infringement Cases within the Common European Asylum System

Asylum Procedures Directive 2005/85/ EC and
2013/32/EU (recast)

Reception Conditions Directive 2003/9/EC and
2013/33/EU (recast)

Qualification Directive 2004/83/ EC and 2011/95/
EU

8 bad application or nonconformity cases: Greece, Italy (3 cases),
Cyprus (2 cases), Hungary (2 cases)
18 non-communication cases: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia
7 bad application or nonconformity cases: Greece, France, Italy (2
cases), Cyprus (2 cases), Hungary
19 non-communication cases: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Poland, Romania, Sweden,
Slovenia
1 bad application or non-conformity case: Italy
13 non-communication cases: Slovenia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Portugal,
Poland, Malta, Italy, Hungary, France, Finland, Spain, Lithuania,
Romania

Dublin III Regulation 604/2013

1 case: Italy

Eurodac regulation 603/2013
Directive 2011/51/EU amending Council
Directive 2003/109/EC to extend its scope to
beneficiaries of international protection

4 cases: Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus
7 non-communication cases: Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia,
Slovenia, Austria

Source: “Managing the Refugee Crisis: Balancing Responsibility and Solidarity on Migration and Asylum,”
European Commission, accessed February 12, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/european-agenda-migration/backgroundinformation/docs/balancing_responsibility_and_solidarity_on_migration_and_asylum_20160210_en.pdf, 2.

It can be seen that almost every member state is involved in an open infringement case
(with the exception of Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovakia, and the UK), with the most
infringement cases open against Italy, Greece, and Cyprus. This contributes to the questionable
effectiveness of the Commission’s funding. However, it must be noted that many internal issues
within these countries unrelated to EU asylum law may contribute to such high number of
infringements. In order to support the claim that the Commission’s funding is not sufficient, we
shall look at the announcements of member states: the Greek government, for example, has
announced that Greece is not financially capable to bear such a high influx of refugees and asked
for additional contributions from the EU.19

“Refugee Crisis: European Leaders demand urgent support for Greece,” The Guardian, March 1, 2016, accessed
March 3, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/01/refugee-crisis-european-leaders-demand-urgentsupport-for-greece.
19
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As explained above, the mechanisms for dealing with immigration are in place. However,
the refugee crisis is of a greater scale than the immigration patterns that were being considered at
the time when the EU immigration policy was established.
The main obstacles towards a more effective asylum system on an EU level are as
follows: 1) it is difficult to keep national immigration frameworks consistent with the EU
immigration system; 2) immigration directives and laws are not adequate; their revisions do not
improve existing laws in practice; 3) the EU fails to acknowledge change in immigration patterns
over time; 4) there are limitations of Frontex that are not being addressed; 5) the lack of
transparency about the EU immigration system persists in individual member states.
i)

National immigration framework versus the EU immigration system

In addition to being a part of the Common European Asylum System, all the member
states keep their own national immigration framework. This can often result in clashes between
the two frameworks. Pascouau further supports this claim by saying that the EU migration policy
is impossible to understand. He summarizes it as follows: “There are specific rules defining
different conditions of entry for specific categories of migrants … and allowing in specific cases
each of the Member States to maintain their national system in parallel.” 20 Keeping their national
systems then prevents harmonization policies to take place, making it more difficult to achieve
an effective immigration policy.
ii)

CEAS directives and their revisions

The second flaw of the CEAS is that the directives and revisions of these directives are
not adequate. Statewatch, a non-profit voluntary group comprised of professionals, monitors
these policies and subsequently publishes its own comments and suggestions. As a part of
Matthias Mayer, Yves Pascouau and Shada Islam, “Three Challenges for tomorrow’s EU migration policy:
fairness, mobility and narratives,” Brussels Think Tank Dialogue, discussion paper, January 28, 2015, accessed
January 28, 2016, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/BackgrounderMigration.pdf, 4.
20
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Statewatch analysis, Peers argues that the revised Asylum Procedures Directive (2015) allowed
member states to keep their standards low, meaning that the second phase of the Common
European Asylum System looks very much like the first phase. Moreover, he claims that the
changes adopted by the revised Asylum Procedures Directive are “largely cosmetic changes to
the current inadequate standards, to the extent that adopting the new rules would be like putting
‘lipstick on a pig.’”21 According to Peers, the changes which aimed towards significant
improvements had been removed by the European Council; these include “the cut-back of the
grounds for accelerating proceedings, the number of exceptions from the right to remain in the
territory during an appeal, the exemption from limits on procedural rights for unaccompanied
minors and persons with special needs, other new rules regarding persons with special needs,
early access to country-of-origin information and reports on interviews (in light of the possible
denial of an in-country appeal).”22 Peers claims that by introducing a ‘super-safe’ third country
rule, the Directive violates multiple international treaties.23
In regards to the revised Reception Conditions Directive, Peers argues that although the
number of detentions will most likely decrease, the time limits for detention of those falling
under many possible remaining cases have yet to be determined. Moreover, the Directive does
not prevent member states to “derogate from the rules on female asylum-seekers’ safety and the
privacy of detained families.”24 Peers summarizes the revised Reception Conditions Directive as
“a missed opportunity to ensure that asylum-seekers in the EU are fully treated with dignity and

Steve Peers, “Statewatch Analysis – The Revised Asylum Procedures Directive: Keeping Standards Low,”
Statewatch, May 2012, accessed February 23, 2016, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-178-asylumprocedures.pdf, 2.
22
Ibid., 12.
23
Peers refers specifically to Geneva Convention, international human rights law, and the EU Charter on
Fundamental Rights.
24
Steve Peers, “Statewatch Analysis – The EU Directive on Reception Conditions: A weak compromise,”
Statewatch, July 2012, accessed February 23, 2016, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-184-receptioncompromise.pdf, 6.
21
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fairness in all respects while waiting for a decision on their application, given the many
possibilities which remain for Member States to detain them, provide them with low levels of
benefits, delay their access to employment and make it difficult to challenge any of these
decisions.”25
iii)

Failure to recognize changes in immigration patterns

Another one of the fundamental flaws of the Common European Asylum System has
been the failure to recognize that immigration patterns to and within the EU change over time.
Therefore, building on and revising existing legislature from before the 2004 enlargement, rather
than creating new legislation, results in a system that cannot effectively respond to the current
refugee crisis, as well as any future crises. Collett26 claims that the implementation of EU
immigration policy is for many small newer states an abstract process because they have
experienced a relatively small number of immigrants in the past. Additionally, an obstacle for
effective immigration policy is the effort of the EU to develop it in pursuance of an ever-closer
union. Collett claims, “This can … obscure real policy needs in favour of the formalistic desire
to expand the reach of EU immigration policy.”27
Additionally, Boswell and Geddes28 criticize the current immigration policy that builds
on the policies adopted in the 1990s because the first phase of asylum policy integration was
based on two assumptions: firstly, the prevailing perception in the 1990s was that refugees were
abusers of the European system and the policies should be tightened. Secondly, cooperation in
regards to external immigration was necessary in order to disable any easy access to EU territory
and adopt restrictive measures across the EU states. It was also assumed that non-EU states on
25

Ibid., 7.
Elizabeth Collett, “Facing 2020: developing a new European agenda for immigration and asylum policy.”
27
Ibid., 8.
28
Christina Boswell and Andrew Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union (London, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011).
26
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the borders of the EU would collaborate with the EU on protecting its borders. Since these views
have changed, it is unreasonable to build on past legislation regarding EU immigration policies.
Collett lists three major changes in immigration patterns: firstly, the immigrant
communities are more diverse in terms of country of origin, motivation for immigration, and
length of stay than at the time of a five-year plan development in 1999. Collett claims that the
current policies treat spouses, refugees, and dependent children as ‘non-economic’ migrants and,
therefore, misunderstand “the potential and motivation of a large swathe of the immigrant
population.”29 The second change is that the number of second-generation immigrants increases,
which has to consequently lead to debates about their social inclusion. Finally, immigrants are
changing the nature of their settlements by moving beyond cities to locations less familiar with
such diversity. This means that a higher number of local authorities have to become involved in
the management of these diverse communities as they spread beyond urban cities.
It is therefore clear that the common European asylum and immigration policy cannot
simply be a culmination of previous revisions to immigration and asylum plans, but it should
reflect the current changes in immigration patterns. However, the most recent plans have been
exactly that. The Stockholm Programme, adopted in 2010, in which the establishment of the
Common European Asylum System by 2012 had been among the highest priorities, “has focused
on reviewing and reforming existing legislation, rather than on developing new policy
frameworks.”30 If the EU is to respond to the current refugee crisis effectively, it must abandon
the old rules and come up with a new and effective framework grounded in recent events and
developments.

29
30

Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 4.
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iv)

Limitations of Frontex

Frontex has also suffered criticism. Since the agency was founded in the discourse of
immigration being a suspicious activity linked with crime and criminal activity, Frontex’s joint
operations are claimed to often violate fundamental rights of migrants as the physical protection
of the EU’s borders includes use of force. The European Ombudsman has also criticized Frontex
for not complying with human rights mechanisms.31
Despite all the regulations, the EU immigration and asylum policy grants the member
states with exclusive responsibility in terms of immigration law maintenance in their territory.
Since Frontex works similarly to an intergovernmental agency, Trevisanut32 argues that
‘compulsory solidarity’ among the member states has been standing in the way of Frontex’s
success. Trevisanut also claims that “member states need help in managing their external
borders, but are still reluctant to accept the intervention of any other actor on the basis of an
institutionalized mechanism.”33 Finding the balance between security and protection of rights is
therefore difficult, and some argue that it is impossible due to an ongoing interest of member
states to maintain the integrity of their borders.34 Since the EU-led agencies rely on Member
States and the Commission in terms of their competencies and funds, agencies such as Frontex
are quite limited in enforcing the implementation of these policies.

“Special Report of the European Ombudsman in own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning
Frontex,”
European
Ombudsman,
last
updated
2016,
accessed
February
29,
2016,
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/specialreport.faces/en/52465/html.bookmark.
32
Seline Trevisanut, “Which borders for the EU immigration policy? Yardsticks of International Protection for EU
Joint Borders Management,” EU Migration Law: Legal Complexities and Political Rationales, ed. Loic Azoulai and
Karin de Vries (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).
33
Ibid., 147.
34
Richard Barnes, “The International Law of the Sea and Migration Control,” Extraterritorial Immigration Control,
ed. Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010).
31
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v)

Lack of transparency and solidarity

Starting with the new century, the EU has come to be generally blamed for the increase in
unwanted immigration by member states and their populations. However, this claim is based on
an assumption that immigrants’ final destination is Europe, and fails to recognize the fact that
immigration is highly inter-regional and that the EU as a supranational organization has little or
no effect compared to national governments. Member states refusing to claim responsibility
leads to a decrease in solidarity and an inability to deal with the refugee crisis effectively. It is
therefore necessary for the public to better understand the actions of the EU. That is why many
experts argue for higher transparency of the EU’s role on immigration.35 Once the statistics are
translated into human narratives and become more transparent and accessible, the EU can
connect with the public in a real sense. So far, however, the EU has not recognized the interregional feature of current immigration flows. As long as the EU fails to acknowledge the
increasing role of regional actors that are responding to the needs of their communities, the lack
of public support will result in the absence of much needed solidarity. Transparency can be
difficult to achieve if there is a high number of organizations involved in the policymaking and
each of them have different goals and priorities. The beginnings of the EU common asylum and
immigration policy were influenced by new institutionalism, which presents the idea that
institutions are political and partisan. Each of the institutions involved in the immigration policy
shapes the knowledge and preferences, many times even creating the momentum for policy
change. The immigration policy created by these institutions then lacks coherence, and therefore
its effectiveness decreases. As Boswell and Geddes claim, the different strategies of the
European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European
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Commission impact the policy, which then “proceeds in a rather disjointed and inconsistent
fashion.”36
d) Suggestions for improvement
In addition to the transparency of the EU’s role on immigration, the immigration and
asylum policy should undergo changes that reflect the changing nature of EU immigration
patterns. As Collett says: “If leaders are unable to dispel the belief that an established policy
should never be questioned, then any future agenda will be doomed to both a narrow vision and
repeated mistakes.”37 Questioning established policies, including the EU immigration and
asylum policy is a key aspect of successful and effective responses to conflict situations. Collett
argues for proactive and forward-looking immigration strategies but also for acknowledging the
increasing complexity of immigration patterns and trying to “avoid approaching the topic in a
one-dimensional manner.”38 She claims that the EU should adopt a long-term strategy “that
doesn’t just incorporate the needs (and limits) of its individual Member States, but encapsulates
their hopes, fears, and aspirations.”39 This should be accomplished through consultations
between policymakers and representatives (experts, politicians, stakeholders) in every country.
Taking into account the opinions of these representatives will certainly contribute to the
effectiveness of immigration policies, as opposed to a “one-size-fits-all” approach, which makes
the immigration policy less responsive to countries’ needs and therefore less effective.
Another important factor to consider is the length of the planning cycle and flexibility of
these policies. Although a long-term agenda could definitely create a framework for immigration
policies, it is important to mention that long-term plans can be quite ineffective in the context of
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an ever changing globalized world. The example of the current refugee crisis might come into
mind; it would be questionable to assume that the EU would be ready to respond to the high
number of refugees based on policies created more than 10 years ago. This is not to say that
reflecting on the next 10-15 years is invalid, but it must be acknowledged that these policies
should be flexible enough to adjust to changing events.
In her latest policy brief, Collett40 stresses the need for leadership and coordination in
terms of political and technical commitments, as well as change in investments envisaged by EU
leaders in order to provide the resources to effect this change. Since the current immigration
mechanisms for implementing EU policy are not capable of being carried out effectively and in a
timely manner, Collett provides several suggestions aimed at their improvement. Firstly, she
argues for a strong investment in leadership in order to create more diplomatic power capable of
carrying out policy goals within and outside of the EU. Secondly, coordination within the EU
should be improved on the level of the European Commission and the European Council. The
Commission should come up with coordination mechanisms and identify realizable, but, most
importantly, common goals across the Union. This is an important point, building on Boswell
and Geddes’s criticism of different priorities across EU’s organizations. Thirdly, Collett
recommends investing in human resources in terms of staffing the Directorate-General for
Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion and External Action Service with experts with onthe-ground experience. Fourthly, Collett highlights the need for evaluation mechanisms which
would monitor the success of proposed legislation not only in the European Council but also on
the ground. Lastly, she argues for a need to identify benchmarks for success, which take into
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account national contexts. Although the EU unites its member states, their policy investments
differ. Therefore, the immigration policy constructed on the EU level must reflect the different
contexts of each individual state.
Monitoring the implementation of immigration policies is one of the biggest challenges
because when a state fails in the implementation of these policies, it weakens the EU as a whole.
Collett41 argues for a more in-depth and robust approach to the monitoring of states’
implementation of these policies. However, member states might not accept deeper monitoring,
especially if they are under the assumption that they have to give up more of their sovereignty to
the EU. Thus, shared responsibility may be the best solution because states would be involved in
the monitoring process and, therefore, more interested in the outcome. Consequently, the states
would be more likely to undergo the needed reforms.
Similarly as Collett, Peers also stresses the importance of questioning and improving the
current directives and regulations. He argues, for example, that in regards to the revised Asylum
Procedures Directive, the EU should “raise procedural standards during the second phase of the
Common European Asylum System42 in order to ensure that those persons who are genuinely
facing persecution or serious harm have a fair opportunity to prove it.”43
e) Conclusion
The current EU immigration and asylum policy has its roots in 1990s; the nature of
immigration however has changed dramatically since then. Building on the existing frameworks
and revising previous regulations does not contribute to the creation of an effective policy. New
institutionalism that affects these policies decreases transparency and cohesion of immigration
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policies. The number of infringement cases points to an ineffectiveness of these policies as well
as to the fact that the needs of member states are not being properly addressed. The immigration
policy is not responsive or flexible, and does not reflect changes and developments of new
events. Moreover, mechanisms evaluating the implementation of these policies are not in place
mainly because of the refusal of certain member states. Finally, Frontex, an agency established to
protect EU borders, takes part in the violation of fundamental rights, being responsible for the
highest number of refugees drowned in the Mediterranean Sea to date.
Multiple suggestions to improve the immigration policy have been mentioned, such as
leadership improvement and better coordination within the EU, investment in human resources,
and establishment of more in-depth evaluation mechanisms. Trevisanut argues that “member
states’ particular self-understanding, their relationships with neighbouring countries, and their
powers in controlling their external borders have so far stood in the way of a level of European
integration that would allow for a coherent and much needed management of external borders.”44
This claim reflects the real political climate within the EU, which has resulted in an ineffective
management of the refugee crisis.
The above mentioned suggestions should increase the EU’s ability to effectively deal
with the current refugee crisis, but also avert similar crises in the future. If the EU does not,
however, figure out a way to improve its policies to effectively respond to the current situation,
the crisis will negatively affect the region in multiple ways. In the short term, the crisis will
create instability at economic, political and security levels and “add pressure to an already shaky
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regional security landscape.”45 Moreover, poorly managed migration will contribute to wagedumping and skeptical public opinions, which can be then exploited by populist politicians. The
poor treatment of refugees also diminishes the EU’s influence in their countries of origin. Islam
claims, “When Muslims are targets of racist attacks and discrimination, the EU’s role and
influence in helping to stabilize a very volatile Arab and Muslim world is diminished.”46
Furthermore, without serious long term investment into policies fostering integration and
resettlement, the refugee communities can change into economically deprived and politically
marginalized groups negatively impacting the EU as a whole. Therefore, significant changes to
these policies and the ways in which the EU has been managing the crisis are most essential.
In his speech, Friedman47 presented an argument that the EU is capable of handling the
inflow of refugees; however, the essential cause of the problem is that the member states cannot
decide and agree on how exactly the crisis should be handled. If this is true, then the crisis
management will not be improved by just changing the immigration policy. It is then necessary
to look for an explanation elsewhere. I suggest exploring the different approaches that two
individual countries have had towards immigrants, refugees, and minorities in order to lay a
framework for a discussion of policy change.
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Chapter 2: Impact of history and economy on different attitudes towards
immigrants
The many different ways the EU countries handle the inflow of immigrants to Europe is
an important example of an internal incoherence. Two countries whose attitudes towards
immigrants appear to differ greatly from each other are Germany and Hungary. The question
remains, why are the attitudes and policies of these two countries so different? Or yet, are they?
Keeping in mind that the actions of Angela Merkel and Viktor Orban and their policies do not
necessarily represent the entire population, it is also necessary to consider the societal views. The
history of immigration, role of economy in immigration policy, the role of media and attitudes
towards minorities throughout history are all important determinants of contemporary policies
and populations' mindsets.
In this chapter, I will elaborate on these factors in order to provide a better understanding
of these countries’ attitudes and immigration policies.
a) History and nature of immigration to Germany
The changing patterns of immigration to Germany share a couple of common factors.
Firstly, the view of Germans and the actions of the German government in defining immigration
policies fail, to this day, to acknowledge that Germany is, in fact, a country of immigration. 48
Germany has been one of the recipients of the highest number of immigrants and refugees for
several decades. Secondly, the legislature and public views on immigration are embedded in the
shadows of the Holocaust.
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Münz and Ulrich49 recognize six main phases of immigration to Germany after the World
War II: 1) The first phase, the post-war period (1945-1949), is characterized by immigration of
expelled ethnic Germans, refugees of World War II, and survivors of the concentration camps.
Moreover, the government encouraged immigration of foreign labor force, especially from
Mediterranean countries, for economic reasons. 2) Once Germany had been divided by the
Allies, migration between East and West Germany launched the second phase, followed by
bilateral recruitment agreements between West Germany and Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey,
Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. During this period, the number of foreigners in the
country quadrupled. 3) The third phase, framed by the years 1961-1973, is characterized by
major recruitment of foreign workers. This period is a major factor in a rapid increase of the
foreign population in West Germany, during which the number of foreign workers reached three
million (in 1950 there were only 72,000 foreign workers). It is however important to note that
these high numbers did not mean that Germany was becoming a country of immigration. Münz
and Ulrich provide a useful explanation: “The aim of West Germany’s recruitment policy was
not to foster organized immigration but to counterbalance cyclical and demographic bottlenecks
in the West German labor market.”50 This was further supported by the fact that foreign laborers
were getting work and residence permits valid for only one year. 4) Although the oil price shock
and the recession in the country forced the government to shut down recruitment completely, the
increase of foreigners continued through family reunions. The decision of the government to stop
the recruitment of foreign workers had therefore an opposite result. Since guest workers stopped
leaving Germany due to the fear that they would not be able to return, the foreign population in
Germany increased. 5) Following the fall of the Iron Curtain and unification of Germany,
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immigration increased once again due to the war in Yugoslavia which produced many refugees.
By 1994, the foreign population in Germany had reached seven million. 6) New restrictions
limiting immigration of ethnic Germans and asylum seekers which were introduced since 1992
represent the sixth phase. Although Münz and Ulrich mention only six phases, the creation of the
EU common asylum and immigration system and dissolution of internal borders necessarily
leads to a new phase.
Despite this rich history of foreigners’ presence in Germany, the government fails to
acknowledge that these foreigners are no longer temporary workers or refugees, and only slowly
changes the citizenship laws and integration policies. However, the high number of foreigners
immigrating to Germany throughout history is one of the most differentiating factors between
Germany and Hungary.
b) History and nature of immigration to Hungary
The patterns of immigration to Hungary are significantly different than the one to
Germany. Firstly, the total foreign population in Hungary is relatively low (1-2% of total
population); according to the 2014 Census, there are 145,968 foreign people residing in Hungary,
most of which are from Europe (100,501).51 Secondly, ethnic origin of these immigrants is quite
homogenous. While Germany offered refuge to diverse immigrant populations throughout
history (as mentioned above), most of the immigrants to Hungary were of Hungarian origin,
mainly from the neighboring countries. In 2013, amongst the 9,008 naturalized foreigners, 7,333
were from Europe, and from these, 6,999 were from Romania, most likely having Hungarian
ethic origins or linguistic abilities. Although the economic and political situation in their home
country has been a pull factor to a certain degree, it has definitely not been as significant as in the
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case of Germany. Gödri52 refers to “the linguistic-cultural sameness” as the most significant pull
factor for immigrants. This is also the main facilitator in their integration to Hungarian society.
According to Gödri, not only the society, but also the Hungarian government has been
distinguishing between immigrants with Hungarian and non-Hungarian ethnic origin in terms of
privileges. Gödri claims, “Altogether, a paradox situation emerged as although all Hungarian
governments stressed the better life of Hungarian minorities in their birthplaces, there was no
legal obstacle constraining their immigration into Hungary.”53 This seems understandable in
terms of facilitating easy return for members of one nation.
Based on these facts, I suggest that Hungarian population has not been exposed to
foreigners as much as German population has. The frequency of contact with foreigners is an
important determinant of a country’s xenophobia, or tolerance towards immigrants. Therefore,
the lack of contact between the Hungarian population and foreigners is a factor that accounts for
their negative attitudes towards current refugees; whereas, substantially higher exposure of
Germans to foreigners leads to their welcoming attitudes towards these refugees today.
c) Impact of economy on Hungarian and German immigration policies
The evaluation of the past and current economic situations of EU countries is essential in
understanding their immigration policies, which have developed throughout history. Noiriel54
supports this by claiming that there is a connection between state’s policies regarding
immigration, the economic situation of a country, and the management of asylum approvals. He
argues that what the world is facing today is an ideological retreat in the face of global culture.
This, together with economic crisis, leads to xenophobia and an increasing importance of
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national identity. These facts then result in lower numbers of asylum approvals on the one hand
and promote stricter border control and sending refugees to camps on the other hand. Although
Noiriel’s theory does not explain the openness of Germany, it highlights the interconnectivity
between the national economy and immigration policies and can provide an explanation of
Hungarian policies.
History plays a role in this issue as well, as post-communist economies changed from
centralized to market-based economies since 1991. Therefore, advanced Western economies with
strong need for new labor force differ from Eastern economies whose foreign labor force does
not account for such a high contribution to the national economy. It is therefore important to ask
how the evolution of each nation’s economy affects the population’s stance towards immigrants.
Can the economic situation be in fact the strongest determinant for the countries’ actions?
In this regard, the respective developments of both Germany and Hungary’s immigration
policies differ in their purpose. Hungary’s immigration policy developed due to external factors,
for the most part following EU harmonization policies, as opposed to developing policy due to
its own need for new labor. Additionally, Hungary has not experienced a positive impact of mass
labor migration as many other Western countries have throughout history. In 2007, Hungary’s
foreign labor force accounted for approximately 1.5% of the total labor force, which means that
its economy does not depend on foreign workers as much as Germany’s does.
Germany, on the other hand, as one of the strongest economies in the EU, does have a
strong need for a new labor force. Foreign workers currently represent 8.5% of total employment
in Germany. According to International Migration Outlook,55 refugees and further immigration
to Germany will boost the national economy. According to the European Economic Forecast
“International Migration Outlook 2015,” OECD, accessed November 29, 2015, http://www.keepeek.com/DigitalAsset-Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2015_migr_outlook-2015en#page1.
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paper by the European Commission, “the accommodation of refugees will raise social spending
over the forecast horizon, while additional funds provided for infrastructure investment as well
as for social housing in view of the strong immigration flows should gradually increase public
sector investment.”56 Further fostered by the decline in oil prices, the Commission predicts
sustainable GDP growth and decrease of government debt by 10% by 2017. The German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) showed a negative impact of migration on the
German economy in 2015-2016 which was then followed by a positive impact causing the
German economy to grow rapidly (see figure 1). These statistics show how important
immigration has been for the growth of the national economy and could explain the open-door
policy that Germany has towards refugees and immigration.
Figure 1. Economic impact of migration to Germany
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Moreover, demographic factors, such as aging population and low birth rate, are
important influential factors of Germany’s immigration policy. Germany’s fertility rate has been
very low since the 1970s when it dropped to under two births per woman. This number has been
oscillating between 1.4 and 1.5 since then. Life expectancy however increased from 70 years in
1960s to 80 years today.57 As a result, the group of people in their working ages narrowed down
substantially and the retired population grew (see figure 2). In this respect, refugees and other
immigrants provide a solution to Germany’s possible economic stagnation caused by aging
population, declining number of employed people, and low birth rate.
Figure 2. Population pyramids in Germany for year 1990, 2015, and 2025

Source: “Population Pyramids of the World from 1950 to 2100, Germany,” Population Pyramid, accessed
December 4, 2015, http://populationpyramid.net/germany.

The Hungarian national economy, however, is not dependent on immigrants as much as
the German economy. Drbohlav claims that “the Hungarian economic structure features rather a
low demand for migrant workers.”58 The European Commission supports this fact by stating that
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the arrival of refugees would not significantly affect the Hungarian economy. 59 Consequently,
the importance of state integration policies is very low to almost none.60
Hungary, as a member of the EU, is required to share the responsibility of accepting,
relocating, and assisting in the current refugee crisis and represent the united continent. Hungary
(together with Slovakia and Czech Republic) however strongly opposes rules and regulations
coming from Brussels, for which we may account certain historical events. In what way have
Hungary’s struggles against territory losses and Germany’s struggles for nationhood and
transformation of citizenship impacted each country’s attitude towards non-nationals?
d) Impact of history on Hungarian and German immigration policies
The struggle for state sovereignty has a great impact on whether a country is inclined to
comply with EU law or has a tendency to rebel against it. The examination of special historical
events can point to reasons why these countries act the way they do. These may include events
such as the oppression of Hungary under the Ottoman Empire and its loss of territories
throughout history as a result of negotiations led by Great Britain and France, or experience of
communism. Likewise, Germany’s struggle for nationhood and unification, its reunification,
memories of Holocaust, and attempts to deepen European integration certainly play an important
part in its current attitudes. For the purposes of this thesis and in an attempt to address the most
recent generations, I will focus on the following: firstly, I will analyze the impact of the Trianon
Treaty, socialism and shifts in the Hungarian citizenship on past and current policies towards
immigrants and refugees. In order to analyze Germany's behaviors, I will elaborate on the impact
of the Holocaust, the reunification of Germany, and the 2000 German Nationality Act.
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i) The Treaty of Trianon and its impact on Hungarian mindset
When evaluating the impact of historical events on Hungary in terms of shaping its
attitudes towards immigrants, but also in terms of its behavior in basically any international
affair, the effects of the Trianon Treaty cannot be overlooked. The peace treaty that was signed
almost a century ago, marking the dissolution of Austro-Hungarian Empire, and determining
territorial and population losses of Hungary in favor of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and
Yugoslavia, has been considered a trauma for the Hungarian population that lasts even today.
Newspaper articles and the announcements of Hungarian politicians today still refer to the
Treaty. By the end of 20th century, Romsics, a Hungarian historian, wrote:
“… the Peace Treaty of Trianon is still one of the most neuralgic points of
historical consciousness for the Hungarian society but at least for
Hungarian intellectuals, and many are still unable to think and write about
it in an objective manner.”61
In regards to its 95th anniversary in 2015, Hungarians reminded themselves of the famous
words of poet Atilla Joseph: “Our land won’t be smaller, no, not with an inch. You will shine
like long time ago. A shout is running across the Hungarian mountains and plains: We won’t let
Never! Never Arpad’s country!”62
Many scholars claim that the biggest problem of inter-war Hungary after Trianon has
been the inability to accept the reality and direct its attention to solving economic problems of
the time. This might be mainly because, as László63 claims, Hungary suffered collective trauma.
Based on claims of multiple scholars, this trauma however does not necessarily start with
the Treaty of Trianon. The occupation of Hungary by the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century
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could also be taken into consideration, as an example of Muslim-Christian conflict. However,
Schweitzer64 claims that the occupation was not a religious conflict, which is supported by the
fact that Hungarian politicians have until recently cooperated with Muslim nations. Schweitzer
argues that the closed-door attitude “is caused by a succession of national traumas of historic
proportions.”65 In this aspect, the Treaty of Trianon plays a significant role since its influence
spans to the present day, impacting refugees and humanitarianism, or lack thereof, connected
with them. Besides the external effects, the Treaty influences Hungary from within in terms of
shaping the collective identity and identifying Hungarians as a collective victim which results in
maintaining solidarity amongst themselves. László provides a valuable addition to this
explanation by claiming that the trauma that Hungarians to this day experience and which stems
from the Treaty of Trianon is a chosen trauma: “It conforms as well as it contributes to the
collective victim role which proved to be the core organizing principle of the Hungarian national
identity...”66 It is in this thought that Hungarian attitudes towards refugees must be considered
and analyzed. This ideology then explains Schweitzer’s claim that “[Eastern European countries,
including Hungary] perceive themselves second-class citizens in Europe, and are determined to
keep their sovereignty vis-à-vis the forced quota system. They live in incurious, insular societies
to which an African or a Middle Eastern population is incurably foreign, even more so than the
Roma, whom they also failed to integrate.”67
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ii)

Socialism in Hungary
Similarly as the Trianon Treaty, the communism in Hungary has influenced the

Hungarian view on foreigners and contributed to its isolationist tendencies. Communism created
a mentality of dependency on state in Hungary, and homogenized the population to ensure that
everyone is equal. Although Hungary has undergone a transformation since the communist rule,
this kind of mentality has not completely faded away yet. Bollobas also claims, “People still
think in terms of a zero-sum game, as they did during communist days: one person’s gain is
another person’s loss.”68 Additionally, the lack of democratic education during the years after
communism sustained this perception. Therefore, immigrants and refugees are many times seen
as a threat, wanting to benefit from the state at the expense of the population. Another impact of
socialism is that Hungary was closed to immigration during this period and started to meet new
cultures only recently. Therefore, these generations have only a little experience with foreigners.
iii)

Transformation of Hungarian citizenship
The Hungarian citizenship criteria strengthened considerably after the fall of

communism. Since Hungary was closed to migration during communism, restrictive citizenship
laws were not necessary. However, acquiring Hungarian citizenship became more difficult in
1993 by increasing permanent residence requirement and introducing additional conditions such
as clean criminal background, sufficient financial means, or having a place to live.69 Further deliberalization of citizenship acquisition occurred in a family-based acquisition. Dual and quasicitizenship criteria have undergone ethnicization70 aimed at providing citizenship to Hungarian
diaspora. According to the 1993 citizenship law, the conditions for the loss of citizenship were
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liberalized. The law states that no one can be arbitrarily deprived of their citizenship, and the
only way one can lose the citizenship is by voluntarily renouncing it.
The criteria for acquiring Hungarian citizenship necessarily reflect the political and social
climate towards foreigners. Moreover, the shifts in citizenship laws shape the perception of who
belongs to the nation by using a strictly ethnic framework.
iv)

Holocaust
When analyzing any aspect of German politics, society, or culture, the impact of the

Holocaust must be considered. The end for World War II symbolizes not only the physical
devastation of Germany, but also a moral crisis. Germany was deprived of an army – a right of
every recognized nation state, collectively blamed for the acts of the Nazis, and faced with
reparations in terms of reeducation propaganda and Nuremberg Trials. The post-Holocaust
period therefore poses pressures and demands on German population through multiple ways.
The question of collective guilt for the Holocaust was very ambiguous during the early
years of the Federal Republic, since many Germans rejected this concept while emphasizing their
own victimhood. Olick and Levy claim that the rejection of collective guilt “was not simply a
rational attempt to avoid burden, but reflected Germans’ inability to understand their own
implication in what had happened.”71 The topic of the Holocaust had only been a set of taboos
and prohibitions and the discussion about it opened up in late 1960s due to the younger
generations’ rejection of the history. German policies were thus being constructed in this
discourse, as demonstrated by former West German Chancellor Schmidt announcing in 1981 that
their policy should not be “held hostage”72 by Auschwitz. However, even the refusal to associate
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with this part of German history is, in a way, a response to the Holocaust. As Olick and Levy
say, “Virtually every institutional arrangement and substantive policy is a response, in some
sense, to Germany’s memory of those fateful years.”73
Is it then possible to free the German mind completely from its past and construct futureoriented policies and discourse without the shadow of the Holocaust? Olick and Levy provide a
partial answer to this question:
“The possibility of removing the Holocaust as a focus for Germany’s selfunderstanding (and for the way Germany is perceived by others) is thus located in
a contested terrain on which mythical74 and rational75 images of the past
sometimes work together and sometimes do battle, but these images always shape
identity and its transformation.”76
It is therefore necessary to reframe these cultural constraints (both mythical and rational)
in order to reconstruct the relationship between past and present, which is all the more
challenging as Germany plays a central role in the EU and faces new types of self-identification.
Olick and Levy also claim that Germany is held hostage to its collective memory (rather than the
taboo of the Holocaust), and the new policies and attitudes towards refugees reflect the changing
shapes of collective memory. While it is true that the Holocaust is associated with Jewish
minorities and most of the incoming refugees today are Muslims, this distinction does not
necessarily change the feelings of sympathy unconsciously developed throughout the years of
shaping and re-shaping collective memory and liberating citizens from the once assumed or
rejected collective guilt.
Holocaust also has an enormous impact on the Hungarians. While Germany has dealt
with anti-Semitism during the post-World War II, Hungary has not addressed this issue, even
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though 600,000 Hungarian Jews were destroyed in 1944.77 As opposed to Germany, where antiSemitism was attached to a political platform and declined with the demise of the political party,
Hungarian anti-Semitism was rooted in nationalism and Christian identity. Moreover, the
communism in Hungary and the lack of democratic institutions empowered the role of state in
sustaining this ideology. As a result, not claiming responsibility for the role that Hungary played
during the Holocaust and the absence of the post-Holocaust reconciliation in Hungary has
affected its current negative attitudes towards immigrants and refugees.
v)

Re-unification of Germany
Similar to the memories of the Holocaust, the reunification of West and East Germany

plays an important part in the change of policies regarding immigrants and asylum seekers.
Substantial changes in German immigration law have taken place in the early 1990s with the
departure Soviet and Western occupational forces. Furthermore, the reunification had a
significant impact on the transformation of German citizenship and the discourse surrounding it.
Challenging the German naturalization law prior to 1990 is a step towards admitting that
Germany is a county of immigration and therefore must take measures to reflect that. Public
discussions about foreigners or the discourse alone were basically absent before 1980. The
reunification period however sprung the discourse to life in not always positive forms. Although
the reunification period is characterized by protests against foreigners, the government’s efforts
were directed towards creating a multicultural society. As Klopp says, “The years from 1989 to
1993 definitely marked a time of considerable upheaval, but the legal, political, and social events
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of this period have not decisively derailed local and federal efforts towards multiculturalism and
integration.”78
This is also reflected in the liberalization of the citizenship. Until the unification,
Germany was a country with one of the strictest naturalization laws in Europe, and naturalization
rates were very low because of a lack of desire on the part of foreigners. Liberalization of
naturalization laws took place due to many historical determinants rooted in the decades prior to
unification: Firstly, the arrival of guest workers in the second half of 20th century required the
government to change these laws in the 1990s because of a changing nature of stay to long-term
residence of these workers and unification of their families. Secondly, the asylum crisis during
the dissolution of Yugoslavia exposed the negatives of their generous asylum laws when too
many refugees filed asylum applications. Thirdly, the jus sanguinis became impractical and
outdated thanks to reunification of Germany, prior to which this principle was used to attract
immigrants from and put pressures on East Germany. Lastly, the German legal system played a
substantial part in this liberalization by ruling out local voting by foreigners in exchange for
liberalization of citizenship.
Although the naturalization became a little easier, it was still a complicated and lengthy
process. Nevertheless, the number of granted naturalizations rose dramatically from 18,645 in
1972 to more than 300,000 in 1995.79 The German government however introduced and enforced
new citizenship laws until the public, to which this discussion had been closed, became involved.
Howard says, “As soon as the public got involved, …, the full extent of liberalization was
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blocked, and additional restrictive features were inserted.”80 It is then possible to say that the
path towards multiculturalism originally stemmed from the government and that it has taken
many additional years to be accepted by the public.
vi)

German Nationality Act of 2000
The gradual liberalization of the citizenship law resulted in a new Nationality law that

came into force in 2000. The new law has reduced the residency requirement, implemented the
principle of jus soli, and allowed for dual citizenship until adulthood. This act demonstrates the
shift in a citizenship law based on specific ethno-cultural factors to one based on an ethnically
neutral form of identity. Although the law still contains many restrictions, mainly in terms of
dual citizenship, it represents a significant liberalization of the previous laws and changes the
perception of what it means to be German. Moreover, it represents an attempt for increased
integration of non-nationals into the German society.
e) Media
When evaluating public opinions, the role of media should not be overlooked. The media
coverage of the refugee crisis differs greatly between Germany and Hungary. While the media in
Germany stressed the concept of “welcome culture,” the Hungarian press was used to emphasize
the political agenda of Viktor Orban’s party – Fidesz. Research shows that the Hungarian media
reinforced the government’s anti-refugee propaganda, omitting the humanitarian side of the
crisis. Instead, it focused on highlighting the security threat that led to the rising levels of
xenophobia.81 German media, on the other hand, praised Angela Merkel’s decision to open doors
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to a high volume of refugees, and used the Wilkommenskultur “to turn ordinary people into good
Samaritans and encourage them to carry out acts of kindness towards newcomers.”82 This
positive coverage changed as a result of the Cologne assaults in 2015, when news became more
skeptical in the description of refugees. This might have contributed to the decrease in support of
Angela Merkel during the 2017 elections.
Media has therefore a great impact on shaping the attitudes of populations towards
immigrants. The coverage varies from humanitarian narratives, inciting the responsibility to help,
to emotionless framing, supporting the propaganda of right-wing parties. In this way, the media
influences policy decision-making and shapes immigration policies in every country.
f) The role of elite politics
Closely connected to media, elite politics has shaped public opinions in both countries
throughout the history. The idea of collective victimhood in Hungary (as explained in following
chapters), for example, is being sustained by the political elites in schools and in public in order
to maintain the nation’s integrity.83 The liberalization of the German citizenship as well as the
2000 German Nationality Act is also a result political elites that occurred without consultation
with the general public.84
As previously shown on an example of the refugee crisis, governments’ campaigns
appeal to public’s emotions and shape the population’s attitudes according to their agenda. In
Hungary, media outlets emphasized the anti-immigrant political agenda of the ruling political
party and contributed to maintaining and increasing of xenophobia. In Germany, Angela
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Merkel’s open door policy and its media coverage have led to the society’s higher acceptance
rates. Therefore, the impact of history is closely related to the ways in which the elite politics has
shaped it.
g) Conclusion
History is an important factor to consider while analyzing actions of every nation. The
impact that the Treaty of Trianon and communism had on Hungarian population lasts until today
and is visible not only in the attitudes of the society, but also in its effects on policymaking. The
Holocaust, reunification of Germany, and the 2000 German Citizenship Law had significant
impacts on the actions of Germany as well. While German citizenship criteria liberalized, the
rules for acquiring Hungarian citizenship strengthened. Additionally, the higher level of
exposure to foreigners in Germany (as opposed to Hungary) throughout history accounts for its
attitudes towards current refugees, which are considered friendlier than the attitudes of most
countries in the EU.
Moreover, the size of the national economy has an enormous impact on the decisionmaking of every country. Actions are often taken in order to strengthen the national economy.
Germany as one of the strongest economies in the EU does have a strong need for new labor
force, but the importance of new labor force is not necessarily the same for Hungary.
Finally, media and elite politics shape public opinions towards immigrants and refugees
in every country. While the Hungarian press reinforces the right-wing government propaganda,
the German media emphasizes the concept of humanitarianism advocated for by Angela Merkel.
For all these reasons, it is understandable that the attitudes of these two countries differ.
Differences in their internal immigration policies and experiences with foreigners, as well as in
the size of their economies hamper the concept of shared responsibility of incoming refugees
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amongst all the EU members on the governmental level. What role then does a society play in
this concept? What are the current attitudes of individuals within these societies towards the
refugees and how do they contribute to the immigration policies of each country and the EU
overall? How exactly does an experience of cultural diversity and multiculturalism affect the
overall image of the country on an international level?
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Chapter 3: Public Attitudes towards Immigrants
Public policy and public opinion are among the most important factors determining
national attitudes towards foreigners. Moreover, these two factors influence each other. Public
opinion is shaped by the policy in place, and public policy is based on the opinions of the public.
It is therefore important to consider these two factors while analyzing national attitudes towards
refugees in Germany and Hungary. In this chapter, I describe public attitudes towards
immigrants and Islam in Germany and Hungary in order to provide better understanding of the
countries’ policies towards immigrants.
Cagla E. Aykac illustrates the weak spot of the EU by saying: “Europe today is not
uniform or homogeneous in terms of its relation or vision for its identity in general terms.”85 If
Europe’s vision for identity is not homogenous, then how can its relations to other nations,
cultures, or religions be clear-cut? The EU’s perceptions of Islam have been negatively shaped
by historic events, representing mainly terrorist acts triggered by 9/11. Historical analysis of this
anti-Islamist discourse is absent in the EU and the discourse is maintained and reinforced.
Historical analyses and critiques of deep-rooted discourses are essential mainly because in their
absence these discursive forms transform into canons which remain unquestioned. These canons
then “blur the need to recognize the highly political significance of the ways in which history is
told.”86 Recent terrorist attacks therefore reinforce xenophobic attitudes and ethnic stereotypes
hindering EU’s ability to adapt to the multicultural reality.
National feelings of EU member countries are framed in this context. Research shows
that approximately 23.80% of Hungarians did not want foreigners for neighbors in 2009,
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whereas in Germany statistics estimated only 13.30% responded similarly in 2009, figure that
climbed to 21% by 2014.87,88 These statistics must however be evaluated against the contextual
background; these numbers may not represent the general opinion towards other cultures but
may be just a reaction to events taking place in recent years. Political unrest in the Middle East,
creation of ISIS and its imminent consequences for Europe, as well as the refugee crisis can
explain these numbers.
a) Germany
In Germany, the acceptance rate of minorities in general is largely influenced by postHolocaust discourse. I argue that three factors shaped the discourse of collective guilt:
international environment, generational change, and changing interest of elites. International
environment refers to the post-war reconstruction of Germany in the setting of the Cold War.
After World War II, three quarters of Germany were occupied by the Allies, which started the
process of German re-education. The impacts of this occupation on education in Germany will
be mentioned in the next chapter. The process of shifting from the narrative of victimhood to the
contrition narrative has been further promoted by generational change. This factor is based on
the claim that Germans born after the World War II “are less compromised by their complicity in
Nazism and better able to examine it critically.”89 Lastly, ideational change is a result of shifting
interests of elites. The Nazi past has become a tool for achieving concrete goals in election
campaigns or public debates. Thus, the combination of international influence and reconstruction
of Germany, the generational change (specific only to Germany), which led the public debate
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and provided foundation of the shift from the victimhood mindset, with support of elites all
resulted in the creation of the “culture of contrition.”90
This culture is reflected in Germany’s current public policy relating to minorities. The
public policy contains legal framework for inclusion of minorities in political representation as
well as social benefits. Immigrants’ interests in politics are represented by joint advisory councils
at the state level and by Federal Immigration and Integration Council at the federal level.91
Immigrants’ issues and complaints are addressed by the Commissioners for Issues Relating to
Foreign Populations who work at both the federal and municipal level. Direct participation in
political life is however limited due to the fact that only German citizens are allowed to vote or
hold public office. EU citizens can vote in German city and municipal elections.92 This has been
slightly alleviated by lowering the threshold for naturalization to eight years of permanent
residence. Since public policy has direct impact on public opinion and vice versa, such inclusive
policies lead to a public opinion that is more accepting towards minorities. Donovan also adds,
“Shifts in elite opinion and public policy on the question of citizenship and immigration that
have been taking place for decades now, suggest that Germany has been moving, however
slowly, in the direction of more formal acceptance of greater cultural pluralism and political
inclusiveness.”93
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i)

Attitudes towards Islam and immigrants in Germany
The statistics representing the German public’s views of Muslims have shown that in

2015 the majority of Germans perceived Islam as a threat and danger. The Bertelsmann
Foundation survey94 published the following findings:
-

57% of Germans thought that Islam posed a threat;

-

61% of Germans agreed that Islam was incompatible with the Western world;

-

40% of Germans felt like strangers in Germany because of the presence of Muslims;

-

24% of Germans claimed that Muslims should not be able to immigrate to Germany.

These results however differ among different age groups, as only 30% of younger people (16-24
years old) agree with the above statements, as opposed to 60-65% of older people (30 years and
above).
A more recent study95 in 2017 was conducted on attitudes towards immigrants in
general, and showed that Germany is more accepting than most other EU countries:
-

42% of Germans (as opposed to only 9% of Hungarians) thought that immigrants
contributed to the economic growth of their country and general prosperity;

-

45% of Germans (as opposed to only 10% of Hungarians) thought that immigrants
were needed to improve the demographic development of the country;

-

58% of Germans (as opposed to only 20% of Hungarians) did not agree with the
statement that immigrants were dangerous to public safety;
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-

73% of Germans believed (as opposed to only 27% of Hungarians) that their country
should grant asylum and protection to refugees.

Building on these numbers, it is then not surprising that Germany has had a welcoming
attitude towards new refugees. I suggest that at the state level, the main factor in welcoming
refugees is the need for a new labor force; whereas at a societal level, a reason for this
acceptance is that Germany has in fact become more accepting towards different cultures and
religions. According to multiple studies, anti-Semitic feelings in Germany have decreased, and
Laurence also argues that “Germany is growing into its status as a multicultural democracy.”96
One determinant for this shift may be the emphasis on post-Holocaust reconciliation. A
particularly important piece of evidence supporting this statement is the fact that physical attacks
on Muslims in Germany automatically trigger a debate about right-wing extremism.97 A failure
to uncover neo-Nazi groups in Germany is often blamed for these attacks. Thus, any event
related to right-wing extremism is met with major precautions to quell its development. Because
of the history specific to Germany, this might not necessarily be a reaction in other countries.
According to many experts, German reconciliation is an ongoing process and will not stop in the
next few decades to come.98
b) Hungary
The discourse and public policy regarding minorities and refugees in Hungary is largely
based on the nation’s homogeneity, which is a result of a reshaping of Hungarian boundaries
after World War I and anti-immigration policies during communism. The current prime minister
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builds on the idea of Hungarian traditions and importance of ethnic cultural traits in order to
restrict immigration from outside of the EU. The fact that the public policy goes hand in hand
with the public opinion is clearly visible in the case of Hungary as public attitudes towards
current refugees reflect the negative discourse maintained by Orban and his government.
i) Attitudes towards Islam and immigrants in Hungary
Hungarians’ views of immigrants from other ethnic groups explain their current attitudes
towards refugees. I will elaborate on Hungarian attitudes towards immigrants as I did with
Germany. This is important mainly because Hungary is considered to rank the lowest in terms of
attitudes towards immigration in general; Bart Meuleman et al.99 claim that based on their study
of 17 European countries, negative attitudes in Hungary were the most widespread. According to
the report conducted in 2010,100 the following findings represent the public opinion of
Hungarians:101
-

60% of Hungarians thought there were too many Muslims in the country;102

-

53% of Hungarians claimed that Islam was a religion of intolerance;

-

60% of Hungarians believed that Muslims in Hungary were too demanding;

-

76% of Hungarians believed that Muslim’s attitudes towards women contradicted
their values.
A more recent Pew report (conducted in the spring of 2016)103 showed that 72% of

Hungarians still had unfavorable views of Muslims in the country. Moreover, 86% of
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Hungarians believed that Muslims wanted to remain distinct from the host society and did now
show a desire to assimilate.
These negative feelings are well reflected in the current refugee crisis. The fact than less
than a half of Hungarian population has a sufficient knowledge regarding the refugees makes
government propaganda a factor in promoting distrust towards refugees. The Medián poll104
(conducted in October 2015) estimated the following:
-

79% of Hungarians believed in further restrictions against refugees;

-

58% of Hungarians thought that refugees were aggressive, violent, and did not obey
the laws and customs of the country;

-

68% of Hungarians supported the decision to build the fence (a poll conducted by
Republikon105 however estimated that only half of the Hungarian population
completely agreed with the ways the government handled the refugee crisis.);

-

34% believed that the borders should be completely sealed;

-

Only 26% of Hungarians thought that immigration was important for demographic
reasons.

Although the last statement might be valid due to the small Muslim population in
Hungary, the poll also lists fear of contagion in terms of infectious diseases and terrorism as
main factors of the above statistics. Moreover, more than a half of Hungarians feared that
Muslims would become a majority in Europe due to declarations of government officials. The
majority of these fears are unsupported by facts since the medical community clearly denied
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threats of diseases. Furthermore, the 1% that the Muslims constitute within the Hungarian
population hardly presents a threat of becoming a majority in the country. These fears therefore
derive from general unfamiliarity with facts and lack of contact with Muslims.
c) Conclusion
German and Hungarian attitudes towards immigrants are well reflected in their public
policies. Germany has adopted multiple legal frameworks addressing minorities, while Hungary
has taken a firm stance against the reception of the current refugees. Since public policies and
public opinion shape each other, Germany’s inclusive attitudes lead to more inclusive policies,
while Hungarian negative attitudes are reflected in their negative public policy. It is therefore
important to address the determinants of these attitudes, in order to understand the adopted
public policies and to construct a framework for a change towards a more united EU.
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Chapter 4: Determinants of intergroup attitudes
In this chapter, I argue that besides public policy, previous contact with immigrants and
formation of national identity are also important factors influencing attitudes towards refugees. I
will elaborate on the important role that contact plays in the shaping of anti-immigrant attitudes.
Moreover, I explain how more frequent contact may lead to a decrease of prejudice and how a
reshaping of the concept of national identity may lead to more inclusive societies. Interaction
between host societies and minorities, formation of friendships, and a higher level of diversity
within a society may all lead to a decrease in prejudice and xenophobia, and eventually decrease
anti-immigrant attitudes.
a) Contact and prejudice
Research shows that contact is one of the main determinants of attitudes between host
societies and immigrants. This research was triggered by Robin M. Williams in the second half
of 20th century, who held that contact between diverse groups decreases prejudice and their
mutual dislike.106 His survey presents findings that growth of extensive contact in an industrial
society leads to decrease in intergroup problems and, moreover, results in lower physical
separation.
Although Williams was first to introduce the contact hypothesis, it has since been
developed and built on in more detail by other scholars.107 Contact, as the intergroup
determinant, is a very broad term and must be specified in terms of its frequency, nature, or
capacity in order to have sufficient effects on the attitudes of societies. Ulrich Wagner et al. state,
“… it can be assumed that contact experiences are especially effective in changing intergroup

106
107

Robin M. Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947).
Such as Sherif and Sherif, Allport, or Pettigrew.

52

attitudes if they are of some personal relevance for the participants in the contact situation.” 108
Besides personal relevance of contact, Gordon W. Allport109 lists other factors that have to take
place in order for the contact to have positive effects: equal group status within a situation,
common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities, law, or custom. Thomas F.
Pettigrew,110 however, refuses these conditions as necessary and considers them facilitative
rather than essential.
i)

Limitations of the contact hypothesis and the importance of quality of the contact
There are, however, also a few limitations of the contact hypothesis. Firstly, it does not

take into account the fact that host societies may choose to avoid contact with minorities
completely. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the direction of causality is not absolutely
clear. This means that it is difficult to determine whether contact reduces prejudice, since those
with an already low level of prejudice are more likely to seek contact. However, research shows
that although it is true that prejudice affects the frequency of contact, contact by itself does in
fact positively reduce prejudice.111 The third limitation is that for the effects of contact to be
positive, it should take place under favorable conditions. Therefore, instead of the above
mentioned conditions, Pettigrew emphasizes cross-group friendship as the most essential
condition for creating contact experiences with positive effects. He argues that friendships imply
“close interactions” and “potential for extensive and repeated contact.”112 With their research on
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the effect of contact between Germans and Turks, Wagner et al. 113 also proved that a decrease in
the levels of prejudice was only found among Germans and Turks in leisure time contact. Jorg
Stolz’s114 findings during his research in a Swiss town support this hypothesis by confirming that
personal contact with foreigners leads to reduction of Islamophobia and xenophobia in general.
ii)

Contact hypothesis applied to Europe
In considering how this applies to the EU and the current refugee crisis, we must look at

how this theory applies to European countries. Lauren M. McLaren115 claims that contact does
play an important role in terms of lowering threat perceptions, mediating threatening
environments, and reducing hostility towards immigrants in the European context (as opposed to
U.S., where studies delivered conflicting results). This is true without necessarily considering the
quality of contact, although contact under positive circumstances (friendships, leisure time, etc.)
decreases prejudice and perceived threat to a greater extent than contact itself (see figure 3).

Ulrich Wagner, Miles Hewstone, and Uwe Machleit, “Contact and prejudice between Germans and Turks: A
correlational study,” Human Relations 42, no. 7 (1989), accessed July 30, 2016,
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/001872678904200701.
114
Jorg Stolz, “Explaining Islamophobia: A test of four theories based on the case of a Swiss city,” Swiss Journal of
Sociology 31, no. 3 (2005), accessed August 12, 2016,
https://www.academia.edu/3578146/Explaining_Islamophobia._A_test_of_four_Theories_Based_on_the_Case_of_a
_Swiss_City_2006_SZS_31_547-566?auto=download.
115
Lauren M. McLaren, “Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the
Exclusion of Migrants,” Social Forces 81, no. 3 (March 2003), accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598180.
113

54

Figure 3: Percent foreign/Minority Friendship Interaction in the West European Context

Source: McLaren, “Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for
the Exclusion of Migrants,” 928.

Furthermore, McLaren adds that the historical context of immigration to Europe is an
important aspect to consider when evaluating contact between minorities and host societies.
Most of the minorities emigrated to Europe during the post-Holocaust period when open contact
was made more possible thanks to “…increased tolerance and respect for human rights, and a
legal system that promotes these values, all resulting from the horrors of the Holocaust…” 116
Since Western Europe was the main destination for most of the immigrants post-Holocaust, this
explanation might not apply to Hungary to such an extent like it applies to Germany.
Nevertheless, McLaren’s theory provides general support for the importance of contact.
iii)

Positive effects of intergroup contact
Reducing prejudice by increasing contact occurs through several stages. Building on the

importance of contact, Pettigrew117 lists four processes through which attitudes towards other
groups change positively: learning about the outgroup, changing behavior towards the outgroup,
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generating affective ties, and reappraising the ingroup. Pettigrew claims that learning about other
groups and their culture can reduce negative attitudes towards that group, but also adds that this
process alone is not effective and therefore has to be done in conjunction with the other three.
Secondly, he claims that the change of behavior often leads to attitude change and is essential in
this process. Thirdly, affective ties are generated through continued contact experiences, which
eliminate the initial anxiety and invoke empathy. During this process, however, bad experiences
can further increase mutual dislike and lead to worsening attitudes. Lastly, frequent intergroup
contact can reshape the perspective through which one sees their own group and cause an
individual to reevaluate their attitudes towards the outgroup. It is, however, still important to add
that contact is not a panacea for negative attitudes among different groups, because specific
conditions for contact (positive contact, development of friendships, etc.) apply in order for it to
be effective.
Slightly less important for positive effects of contact is the level of immigration to a
country and the size of preexisting minorities. This theory is, in a sense, based on group conflict
theory, which states that the attitudes of one group towards the other are shaped by the
perception that the prerogatives of that group are necessarily threatened by other groups.
Although this contextual variable contributes significantly to the level of perceived threat,
according to McLaren,118 it affects the levels of wanted expulsion from the country only
indirectly. Surveys on this subject show that host populations with established friendships with
immigrants have the same level of threat perception, regardless of levels of immigration.
Furthermore, data to support this hypothesis are not credible enough as the number of minorities
are based on government figures, and every country has a different definition of a “foreigner.”
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The differences in citizenship and naturalization laws between countries then result in a varied
number of foreigners.
Meuleman et al.,119 however, conducted research that concluded that suddenly growing
immigrant populations lead to restrictive attitudes towards the immigrants on behalf of the host
societies. They offer an explanation of “subjective perception of competition,” which means that
the host societies get the impression of more intense economic competition and more difficult
struggle for scarce goods. Rising unemployment in conjunction with higher levels of
immigration then contribute to stronger resistance and negative attitudes towards immigrants.
Marcel Coenders and Peer Scheepers120 also refer to competition for employment in this context,
but claim that is it more often the “perception of rising unemployment” than the actual levels of
unemployment that create more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Based on the research
above, however, these findings should concern only the parts of populations without established
friendships with immigrants.
If the perceived competition in terms of employment and scarcity of goods leads to more
restrictive attitudes, then the economic situation of a country necessarily represents another
determinant of these attitudes. One hypothesis stated by Meuleman et al. was, “In countries with
a suddenly improving economic situation, attitudes towards immigration become less
restrictive.”121 Ira N. Gang et al. also claims, “It is hypothesized that in countries where
economic strain is present, with stagnant or collapsing income and/or employment opportunities,
immigrants will be partly blamed for the economic stress, thus generating the resentment of the
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native-born population.”122 However, they also add that the reality of such a hypothesis is still
open for debate, because attitudes of host societies are for the most part shaped by perceptions
rather than facts.
The governments of these countries then play an essential role in directing the discourse.
Research has shown that inter-group competition strengthens solidarity within specific groups
and therefore governments may create the perception of competition in order to achieve their
own objectives. This is true in Hungary, where far-right government officials often make racist
declarations in order to increase their popularity. Orban’s speech, for example, included remarks
such as, “Muslim refugees breed faster than Europeans, and so they'll wipe us out.”123
Emphasizing competition, which is not necessarily real, shapes the attitudes of the Hungarian
population in a negative way. According to Kim Lane Scheppele, these attitudes are historical
and are necessarily connected with deep-rooted anti-Semitism and anti-Roma feelings.
Furthermore, she adds: “All of it is about the notion that Hungarians are a small tiny ethnic group
which is shrinking in size, that is particularly threatened by all of these groups that seek to
masquerade as Hungarians, take away their territory, take their away their jobs — take away
everything that belongs to Hungarians.”124 Creating a perception of competition remains one of
main characteristics of the contemporary Hungarian government which represents the Hungarian
population. It is therefore necessary to decrease xenophobia in Hungary through positive
intergroup contact.
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To conclude, a specific kind of intergroup contact under specific conditions remains the
most effective factor in attitude change by reducing levels of prejudice and facilitating close ties
among participants that remain stable, regardless of changing levels of immigration to the
country. The questions that still remain are whether the states encourage this contact and if they
put contact supporting policies into place, or whether their agenda is the exact opposite. In the
case of Hungary, it seems that the leaders do not encourage interethnic contact, but instead use
immigrants to strengthen solidarity within the Hungarian nation. Germany, however, as
described in the following section, puts policies in place in terms of education that lead towards
more positive attitudes towards immigrants.
b) Education
i)

Germany
Education in Germany is one of the factors maintaining the nation of contrition,

reminding the public of the importance of the Holocaust in Germany, and supporting higher
acceptance rates towards foreigners and minorities. After the end of World War II, the Allies
began a process of reeducation and denazification. Prior to this process, German textbooks
reflected the National Socialist worldview and had a sense of victimhood from loss of territories
in World War I. The purpose of this program was to eradicate militarism and aggressive
nationalism.125 The new discourse in Germany held that the German people bear the guilt for
World War II and needed to be directed towards the right path. The postwar education system
has been shaped by several landmarks and events in modern history. One of the most important
moments was in 1959, when swastika graffiti, painted by youth, appeared throughout West
Germany. This started a reaction of many critics and attacks on the education system in order to
125
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issue a new range of textbooks, eliminating any moments in history that might seem to glorify
National Socialism. Furthermore, other education activities, such as mandatory trips to Holocaust
memorials, were introduced. In the late 1970s, however, the Broβmann survey revealed that
many students still lacked sufficient knowledge about Hitler and the events of World War II.
Since then, The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the
Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (KMK) issued a number of resolutions emphasizing
the need for basic knowledge of the Nazi period and general enlightenment. KMK has been at
the forefront of ensuring that German schools address the nation’s historical responsibility. The
German educational system still faces criticism from many German scholars in regards to postHolocaust education; however, this criticism can be considered a positive sign of constant
evaluation leading to its improvement.
Intercultural competency in Germany
The level of intercultural experience within German society certainly plays a role in the
country’s ability to engage in cross-cultural communication, mainly because the lack of crosscultural communication can result in tremendous cultural misunderstandings. Therefore, I will
elaborate here on the ways that intercultural competency is embedded in education in Germany;
the difference between Germany and Hungary in this aspect should provide a partial answer to
their differing attitudes.
In Germany, intercultural competency is a part of the German education curricula which
partly explains higher acceptance rate of immigrants. According to Kristin Lange,
“’Interkulturelle Handlungsfähigkeit’, is the ability to communicate and act in intercultural
settings, and is a prescribed goal according to most of Germany’s curricula (Rahmenlehrpläne
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RLP) for the teaching of foreign languages.”126 Lange distinguishes between two approaches
which are used in the German education system when teaching a new language: the traditional
approach (Landeskunde) and the intercultural approach. The traditional approach distances
language and culture: the language is taught in a declarative way and gives students merely a
basis for basic conversations. The intercultural approach, however, teaches intercultural
competence and does not separate language and culture as two unrelated aspects. A result of the
intercultural approach is a speaker who not only acquires sufficient communication skills, but “is
able to negotiate, to analyze, to interpret, and to reflect the socio-cultural aspects of intercultural
communication and secure intercultural understanding.”127
Although the traditional educational approach is still present in Germany and limits the
intercultural competency of new generations, the presence of the intercultural approach in the
German educational system together with increasing contact and specific identity formation128
contribute to the increasing acceptance rate toward other nationalities among the younger
generations.
ii)

Hungary
Similar to the German education system being influenced by the Holocaust, Hungarian

education is influenced by the trauma of being stripped of its territories. Immediately after World
War II, Hungarian intelligentsia and scholars focused on revising history books to reflect the
irredentist tendencies that prevailed in post - World War I Hungary. Vardy claims that this
irredentist activism that translated into literature and education was based on “emotional
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nationalism [intended] to save whatever could be saved and restore whatever could be
restored.”129 The notion of irredentism, as well as the sense of collective victimhood sustained by
the educational curricula in Hungarian schools therefore necessarily contributes to negative
attitudes towards refugees, especially coming from outside of the EU. Arrival of these new
populations might have awakened a sense of self-defense due to the previous occupation by the
Ottoman Empire or the emotional implications of the Trianon Treaty.
Intercultural competency in Hungary
While intercultural competence is being nourished through new educational approaches
in Germany, this is not the case in Hungary. While teaching foreign languages, Hungarian
professors use the traditional approach that understates meaning and context, paying closer
attention to translations and grammar practice.130 Although professors understand the importance
of intercultural competence, they do not integrate it in their teaching practices mainly because
their teaching practices are to a large extent influenced by their own experiences as students.
The absence of the intercultural approach in the Hungarian curricula partly explains
negative attitudes towards other cultures, namely those of current immigrants. However, its
absence does not provide a complete explanation for these attitudes and we must also look at
other factors influencing them.
Lack of intercultural competence and unfamiliarity with facts, which allows government
propaganda to influence the population’s opinions even more, are both determinants of these
negative attitudes towards immigrants. Additionally, as mentioned in a previous chapter,
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practically no state integration policy exists in Hungary, and a legal framework for immigrants’
civic participation is relatively limited because of the small portion that Muslims (and
immigrants in general) constitute within the Hungarian population. Therefore, the minorities
interact with host societies only minimally. This lack of contact may explain the xenophobia and
negative attitudes during a crisis such as the recent one.
c) Identity
Social scientists suggest a number of solutions to anti-immigrant attitudes. Most of them
include interreligious and intercultural dialogue, education in order to increase knowledge about
cultures and their traditions,131 or positive contact between immigrants and host societies. These
suggestions, however, construct only a partial solution as they are organized and planned actions,
not instinctively induced by individuals. Actions that come naturally from individuals are based
on their identity, including the historical formation of it. Identity therefore becomes the most
important determinant of anti-immigrant attitudes and the single most effective tool for their
change. According to the Transatlantic Council on Migration statement, one of the drivers of
immigration anxiety is a fear of loss of culture and identity: “Most publics fear that the common
norms and values that bind societies will be weakened.”132 The statement also emphasizes the
fact that host societies perceive large groups of homogeneous immigrants more threatening than
multiethnic waves of immigrants. Identity and immigration attitudes are therefore inherently
interrelated. For these reasons, it is important to evaluate the impact of identity on attitudes
towards immigrants in both Germany and Hungary.
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i)

Germany
Nationalism and national identity is certainly a very sensitive topic for the Germans

because of their past. After 1945, a discourse that Hitler and the Nazi regime had destroyed the
idea of nationhood and nationalism prevailed. Prior to World War II, national identity was based
on anti-Jewish attitudes, the idea of German superiority, and authoritarianism. Moreover,
nationhood has been linked with National Socialism. Therefore, reforming the concept of
national identity after 1945 meant breaking away from essential elements of German nationhood.
Moreover, the fear of nationalism returned during the unification of East and West Germany.
While the Left opposed the idea of nationhood, the New Right highlighted national identity in its
political framework. The new concept of nation, however, was brought by Liberals when they
“situated the concept of the nation in a new conceptual context, arguing that, for the first time,
freedom, democracy and a unified nation could exist at the same time, and that
Verfassungspatriotismus [trans. constitutional patriotism] and a ‘heterogeneous nation-state’
might go together.”133
The significant changes and new consensus on immigration took place after the
reunification of Germany in 1990s. As a result of reunification, “the new German republic
dismantled or moved away from exclusive self-conceptions”134 dating back to the nineteenth
century. Prior the reunification, East Germans (similarly to Muslims) were associated with the
“other” in order to maintain the stability of the nation by providing security for those who
belonged by defining who did not. This phenomenon, however, constructs “… a static concept of
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the nation that implies inflexibility…”135 Therefore, in order to strengthen the civil society
necessary for responding to the challenges of globalization and growing interdependency,
Germany moved towards a pluralist and open society, eliminating concepts of who belongs to
the nation. The perception of national identity shifted from being based on ethnicity to being
territorially based in the beginning of the 21st century, at the same time the 2000 Citizenship
Act136 was introduced. Although xenophobia and issues with the depiction of Muslims still exist
in Germany, the nation has come a long way to develop a different notion of national identity
and accept citizenship based on jus soli. These historical developments, although still
incomplete, have pushed Germany to become a more accepting society than Hungary.
ii)

Hungary
The shaping of Hungarian identity has also had a tremendous impact on Hungarian

attitudes towards immigrants and minorities. Their current attitudes may seem odd when
described against the historical background; as Antal Szantay and Marta Velladics claim, “Since
the beginning of Hungarian history, to be a ‘stranger’ or ‘foreigner’ has never been a rarity.”137
This trend changed during the 20th century, when Hungary’s size was substantially reduced, and
when the idea of nationalism began to emerge. White138 illustrates the importance of this
moment in history by stating that Hungarian identity is framed by its historical territory, the
Hungarian Kingdom. This is furthermore supported by the fact that since the loss of two thirds of
its territory, Hungary’s alliance with other European countries has been changing based on the
anticipation of gaining an ally that would return parts of territories to Hungary. It is essential to
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mention that many territories that were awarded to other countries after World War I represent
important landmarks in Hungarian history. Cities in present-day Slovakia or places in
Transylvania (today part of Romania), for example, used to be political-cultural centers of the
Hungarian Kingdom for centuries. Other places represent victories of battles and struggles for
national independence during the invasion of the Ottoman Empire. Historical maps and images
of the empire remain on public display even today. White claims, “The Kingdom of Hungary,
and its full territory remain at the root of Hungarian national identity.”139 Therefore, stripping the
nation of places essential to its history has had an understandably devastating impact on its
national identity and sustains the feelings of resentment.
With the loss of its territories, Hungary has lost its diversity of languages and
nationalities, and become a mostly homogeneous country. The Hungarian national identity is still
tied to Hungary’s glorious past, but the recurring traumas pose a threat to the nation’s integrity.
Janos Laszlo’s research reveals that collective victimhood provides a solution to this issue by
interpreting “past identity-threatening events in a way that serves the maintenance of a positive
identity.”140
Moreover, “A permanent war … against the civilian population,”141 that has been taking
place between 1938 and 1963 in form of collectivization, World War II, nationalization, the
revolutions of 1950s, and other injustices, has strengthened the idea of collective victimhood
even more, while obstructing the appreciation of demands for justice by the current minorities.
Therefore, the current diversity of political cultures defining the new Hungarian identity creates
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more challenges to the perception of new immigrants. As Laszlo Keri says, “… it seems highly
unlikely that liberalism and a new political definition of a Hungarian national identity will
replace old-fashioned, traditional notions of Hungarian nationality. State socialism might be
dead, but the ghosts of ethnonationalism are older and still haunt the present, as well as the past,
and most likely the future as well.”142
In order for Hungary to change the perceptions of nationalism, which are tied to
traditions, history, and language, to a new collective identity linked with multiculturalism, the
concept of multiculturalism must be introduced in a positive way. Orban has been condemning
multiculturalism and calling it a “failed West’s experiment.”143 It can be seen that the Hungarian
statesmen maintain the static concept of the Hungarian nation by nourishing the concept of who
belongs to it. In this way they are attempting to construct a certain image of the nation. In order
to change the attitudes towards immigrants, Hungary has to first overcome these obstacles.
d) Conclusion
The attitudes towards current refugees and immigrants in both Germany and Hungary are
influenced by the frequency of past and present contact with immigrants, the characteristics of
the formation of national identities, and public policies in place. Both countries went through
significant moments in history resulting in the construction of collective victimhood. These
historical events are fundamental in the construction of national identity and public policies.
Each country, however, approached these events differently. In Germany, the positive opinion of
immigrants is a result of post-Holocaust reconciliation. This opinion is upheld mostly by younger
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generations with higher levels of contact with immigrants and foreign nationalities, who are the
main agents of the shift in German identity. It is important to mention that there is also a
negative opinion, founded on the fears stemming from terrorism, which is common among the
older generations. In Hungary, the traumas of the past, lower levels of contact with foreigners,
and strong rhetoric from Hungarian statesmen based on the idea of collective victimhood,
contribute to the negative attitudes.
The public and political discourses in both Germany and Hungary have to undergo
certain changes, namely in the construction of identity based on exclusion. Moreover, public
policies should reflect these changes. Certainly, there are many implications of such changes if
the policymakers decide to enforce them. These include, as listed by Foroutan:144 reviewing
school books, diversifying collective symbols, developing media guidelines for representation of
minorities (especially Muslims), and communicating positive integration achievements and the
potential value of migrants to the entire country. Once they are implemented on a state level, the
EU's identity can begin to take its form and unite EU's populations while being flexible enough
to integrate Muslim minorities. Although many scholars believe in the creation of post-national
identity, we should instead be looking for the fine boundary between post-national society and
Kulturnation, which will not cause an absence of cultural belonging on one hand, but support
inclusive policies on the other hand. The above listed changes will be difficult to fulfill
especially if far-right parties are in power. If these changes however will not take place, Islam
(and other cultures and religions) will continue to go hand in hand with xenophobia, making it
difficult for the EU to successfully handle the current refugee crisis and any other future crises
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while remaining united. For now, although significantly more in Hungary than in Germany,
“Islam seems to be the counterfoil to what European identity is perceived to represent.”145
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Chapter 5: New Framework for European Immigration and Asylum Policy
Comparing Germany and Hungary and the factors determining their attitudes towards
immigrants explains the internal incoherence when it comes to the EU immigration and asylum
policy. Each country has a specific history and reasons for their actions and opinions. These
beliefs are based on the historical events and experiences. Therefore, it is important to consider
the uniqueness of each country when constructing an effective and sustainable policy that every
member country complies with. Moreover, it is important to address the concept of heterogeneity
within the EU in order to investigate how it could become a beneficial characteristic of the
Union. After analyzing the issue of heterogeneity, this chapter outlines ideas for a new
immigration framework, while taking into account the differences outlined in the previous
chapters. It is essential to recognize the differences of these two countries because they are on
opposite sides when it comes to the immigration. Constructing a framework based on bridging
the gap between Germany and Hungary will thus encompass most of the diverse needs of the rest
of the EU countries. Therefore, incorporating the differences of Germany and Hungary into a
new immigration policy should provide a framework for a conflict-resolution mechanism within
the EU. The proposed new framework embodies not only immigration policy, but is also
connected to changes in education, public policy, and populism. All these aspects must be
addressed simultaneously in order for an effective immigration policy to take place.
a) Asymmetry as a problem or an advantage
The current refugee crisis is an example of an immigration policy that is not able to
flexibly react to the current situation. One of the main obstacles hindering the EU from
successfully handling the refugee crisis is the asymmetry among nation-states. The current EU
immigration and asylum policy allows for unequal distribution of refugees and unequal costs for
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their protection. The Emergency Response Mechanism that the EU adopted in order to distribute
refugees, takes only the economic and demographic factors into consideration and leaves out
other factors, such as past experiences with immigrants or integration policies in each country.
States have different regulations for asylum seekers while their applications are pending, which
results in a higher concentration of refugees in some states while it remains low in others. While
cooperation among member states is most essential, member states have been unable to come to
an agreement on burden-sharing. The problem with asymmetry is that “highly asymmetric
countries have no incentives to join and remain in a stable coalition.”146 Different levels of
incentives hinder the EU from functioning as an effective solution mechanism. However, the
heterogeneity of the EU is its fundamental characteristic. It is not possible to change it and
therefore it must be considered when constructing joint policies.
An example of this asymmetry is visible in Hatton’s147 findings on preferred levels for
immigration decisions. These findings are based on a survey conducted even before a doublemajority voting principle148 took place. He claims that in 2002, people in Germany preferred to
have immigration decisions made on an international or European level; whereas, Hungarians
preferred to make it on a national level.149 Hungary is an example of a country that has now less
power in the Council, and a society that prefers the national government to have more decisionmaking power than the international collective in matters such as the immigration policy.

Mathias Czaika, “Asylum Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries,” European Union Politics 10, no. 1
(March 2009), accessed April 18, 2017,
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1465116508099762?journalCode=eupa, 89.
147
Timothy J. Hatton, “Asylum Policy in the EU: the Case for Deeper Integration,” CESifo Economic Studies 61,
no. 3-4 (September 2015), accessed April 18, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifv002, 625.
148
The EU unanimity principle (74% of member states weighted votes) was replaced by a double majority principle,
which requires the approval of 55% of Member States which must represent at least 65% of the EU's population.
This change gives less power to medium-size countries like Hungary.
149
These findings are based on a survey conducted in 2002; therefore, today’s results might differ.
146

71

Possible solutions
One of the possible solutions may be more central control. Czaika, for example, claims,
“the implementation of a multilateral asylum (burden-sharing) regime requires a
supranational institution that has the competence (i) to guarantee the steady
commitment of the participating countries, (ii) to coordinate the allocation of
refugee admission numbers, and (iii) to implement, if efficient, an adequate
monetary compensation scheme across participating countries…”150
Czaika and many other scholars151 advocate for more EU intervention in the redistribution of
refugees. The EU has come close to achieving these factors, especially since enacting the doublemajority principle in the EU Council. This voting principle has sped up decision-making in the
Council, but has also given more power to large countries such as Germany and less power to
small and medium-sized countries such as Hungary. However, deeper harmonization of the
asylum policy, which requires strong monitoring system, might not be acceptable by countries
such as Hungary. Imposing rules by the EU, which are decided on mostly by larger countries,
might lead to non-cooperation by individual nation-states, especially when considering the
history and opinions in Hungary. Therefore, more central control seems difficult to achieve in the
near future.
Another solution to this problem is to consider a bottom-up approach. Thielemann and
El-Enany claim, “rather than leading policy harmonization at the ‘lowest common denominator,’
EU asylum laws have frequently led to an upgrading of domestic asylum laws in several Member
States, strengthening protection standards for several groups of forced migrants…”152 Thus, it is
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possible to claim that it is easier for member states to construct their own policy as a reaction to
EU laws than to accept rules imposed by Brussels. The concept of sovereignty is still very
important to member states and their populations and even a slightest idea of its loss would lead
to a decreased cooperation. Therefore, it is essential to find out how an effective framework can
be constructed in this setting, rather than focus on more central control.
b) New framework
In order to achieve a common goal – in this case, an effective immigration policy –
through bottom-up approach, nation-states must have very similar views on immigrants.
According to Hatton,153 the idea of current refugees seen as public good is a best path to states’
cooperation. Although this might be hard to fulfill, it would be certainly easier to construct an
asylum policy if all member states had a united view on refugees. The question still remains how
can this be achieved? It is necessary to consider all the factors mentioned in previous chapters
(history, economy, determinants of public attitudes), contributing to a certain view on
immigrants. Hatton furthermore supports this argument by claiming that “negative attitudes are
associated with economic position, political affiliation, and cultural attitudes.”154
i)

Economy
First of all, the economy plays a great role in this matter. It has already been explained

how the German economy differs from Hungarian economy. Hungary has never experienced a
positive impact of mass labor migration as Germany has. Germany, with its strong economy, has
a greater need for new immigrants than Hungary, where the economy is not as dependent on
immigrants. Moreover, immigration is expected to have a positive impact on the German
economy in the long run. However, other characteristics related to the economy (besides its size)
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are important to consider, such as language. Access to English speaking job opportunities is
essential for new immigrants since it might take a long time to learn the host country’s language.
In order to have a united view on immigrants the nature of these economies must become more
homogenous. For example, Hungary does not necessarily need immigrants today, but with
increasing globalization and the migration of Hungarian youth, its nature will change. Therefore,
Hungary should prepare for and start laying groundwork for a shift towards a more global
economy. Increase in jobs that would adjust qualification requirements to refugees and
immigrants, together with appropriate hiring techniques would increase the contact between
immigrants and the host society, exposing the benefits of diversity in the labor market. Once it is
accepted that immigrants are a contribution to a society, states will cooperate more in the
construction of immigration policies.
Therefore, conveying the importance of globalizing economies is essential. Globalization
will necessarily bring more immigrants into the country and diversify the national populations
everywhere. In order to be able to keep up with this transformation, the Hungarian economic
structure must be prepared for these changes instead of rejecting them. In order to achieve this,
other changes must be adopted as well. Accepting that immigrants may have a positive impact on
the Hungarian economy can seem quite difficult to achieve today because of the Hungarian
history and the fact that they have not experienced positive impact of mass immigration before.
Additionally, the Hungarian history education stresses the period of Trianon and the notion of
irredentism rather than the advantages of diversity during the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Therefore, it is essential that the changes in the economy are adopted simultaneously with
changes in education.
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ii)

Education
Education plays an important role through increasing literacy, shaping knowledge, and

developing cultural sensitivity. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the impact of history
presents several findings. Curricula covering history education differ dramatically between
Hungary and Germany. Education in Hungary sustains the sense of irredentism; in Germany, it
highlights the nation of contrition. Therefore, trauma resulting from the Trianon Treaty (1921)
has left the feelings of collective victimhood among Hungarians alive and they attempt to resist
any efforts coming from the EU that do not correspond with their views. Germany, on the other
hand, engages in an approach protecting human rights in the first place. This is mainly due to its
post-Holocaust reconciliation and education supporting these views. Cultural competency
represents another difference. While in Germany it is an important part of education, cultural
competency is absent in Hungary, where it would help in the integration of immigrants and
decrease xenophobia. Moreover, active engagement of the whole EU would be more effective. In
an ideal case, large countries with substantial immigrant populations and history could help
smaller, less experienced countries in educational changes. This plan would require the large
countries to be extremely sensitive to the history of the small countries. Moreover, an effective,
non-commanding framework would be necessary, persuading the smaller states that the
involvement of the larger states is beneficial to both sides. These could be examples of the
contributions of the refugees to the society and economy, and beneficial effects of diversity.
In addition to the importance of cultural competency, literacy rates affect attitudes
towards minorities. Hatton presents findings that “the less educated are concerned about the
potential labor market competition from low-skilled immigrants,”155 whereas “the more educated
have greater tolerance towards minorities and are more positive about ethnic and cultural
155
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diversity.”156 Therefore, it is important that the literacy and public awareness rates increase not
only in Hungary, but in all EU member states in order to strengthen the likelihood of achieving a
similar view on refugees. Once history education curricula are adjusted to highlight the historical
evidence celebrating diversity, the component of cultural competence is added and improved,
and literacy rates increase, education together with the changing economy can affect positive
change of (but not limited to) Hungarian attitudes towards immigrants.
iii)

Contact
As previously mentioned, contact plays an essential role in decreasing xenophobia and

hostility towards immigrants in Europe. It is therefore important to increase the contact between
host societies and immigrants. One of the ways that proved effective is cultural exchange
programs. Former US President George W. Bush highlighted the importance of studying abroad
by saying that students “gain a better understanding of the many similarities that we share and
learn to respect our differences.”157 Other scholars158 also argue for the development of cultural
competence during these programs. Moreover, a study conducted on this topic presents evidence
that study abroad and cultural exchange programs enhance students' intercultural skills and
promote global understanding.159 Therefore, I argue that cultural exchange programs should be
encouraged and available to all students. Since the frequency and quality of contact with
foreigners is different in every country, xenophobia prevails in many EU states and is not likely
to decrease as long as the contact between host societies and immigrants is absent. It is therefore
necessary to find ways to increase this contact among youth in order for the society to accept
156
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foreigners is its country. These programs are beneficial because they would encourage travel not
only of the youth, but also their families that visit them abroad.
A European student exchange program, Erasmus, is in place and contributes to a higher
intercultural awareness among European nationalities.160 However, cultural exchange programs,
facilitating visits to countries not ordinarily visited by European societies (for the most part
African and Middle Eastern), are essential in this role. Study abroad programs and cultural
exchanges shape students in a way that is beneficial to their personal and professional
development, necessarily affecting the international scene. Students create valuable relationships
and they also “foster goodwill that develops into vibrant, mutually beneficial partnerships among
nations.”161 If study abroad programs are set up in an encouraging way that is accessible to
ordinary students, the contact between these students and foreigners will increase. This increase
will lead to a decrease of xenophobia and promote positive attitudes towards foreigners.
iv)

Counter - populism
Lastly, it is important to increase the awareness between facts and slogans of extreme

right-wing parties related to racism and discrimination. An asylum seeker is many times
conflated with an illegal immigrant and this issue is further supported by bad press and extreme
right wing parties, which make it a central point of their agenda. According to Hatton, there are
“strong links between anti-immigration attitudes and support for extreme right-wing parties.”162
Therefore, as Ritzen and Kahanec rightly claim, “popular sentiments must be weighed in when
devising any policy, but false claims by populists must be countered”…”the start of any
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immigration policy is to take a firm stand against discrimination and racism, while actively
campaigning for the facts and stepping up integration measures.”163 It is therefore important to
educate people on who refugees and immigrants are and what is the context of events they are
situated in.
The new framework would have to take all these principles into account when
constructing a new policy.
c) Conclusion
First of all, it is important to understand that the EU joint policies are not beneficial for
every country and could leave some countries worse off than in the absence of cooperation.
Therefore, the overall benefits must outweigh the costs. The heterogeneity of the member states
will not change, but a similar view on the subject will contribute to more cooperation. This
would furthermore help to remove the variation of refugee policy enforcement in individual
countries.
Therefore, the following framework is proposed: 1.) Cultural acceptance should be
increased by conveying the importance of globalizing national economies; 2.) Education
curricula should be restructured in a way to increase intercultural understanding and literacy; 3.)
Cultural exchange programs should be further developed to include more countries in order to
increase the contact and decrease the xenophobia; 4.) Stricter measures should be adopted to
dispel false populist claims and shape public awareness based on facts and education.
All these principles are necessary in order to create an effective resolution mechanism for
the current refugee crisis and to achieve a flexible immigration policy. The cooperation among
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member states will lead to a better formulation and enforcement of the immigration policy on the
EU and nation-state level.
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Conclusion
The current EU immigration and asylum policy is not suitable for dealing with an
extreme inflow of refugees as we can see on the current refugee crisis. Moreover, building on the
current asylum policy does not contribute to its improvement, as the nature of the EU and outside
circumstances have changed since it was adopted. In this thesis, I have analyzed the difference
between the most opposing countries in regards to receiving refugees, in order to lay a
framework for a discussion of policy change. Examining their differences and bridging the gap
between these two, encompasses most of the other EU countries as well. This was done by
examining their economic structure, history, and past experiences with foreigners. As I have
demonstrated, all these factors are essential to consider because they explain why countries act
the way they do. The Treaty of Trianon has led Hungary to being a nation of irredentism and
sustain the concept of collective victimhood; whereas the Holocaust has transformed Germany
into a nation of contrition. The economic structure plays an important role as some national labor
markets depend more on foreigners than other. Moreover, the frequency of contact with
foreigners is an important determinant of a nation’s attitudes. All these are factors affecting the
countries’ attitudes towards current immigrants.
In order for member states to better cooperate and to construct a framework for
improvement of the current EU immigration and asylum policy, EU member states should have a
similar view on immigrants and refugees, particularly to view the immigrants and refugees as
public good. To achieve this, following recommendations were proposed: Firstly, stressing the
fact that the process of globalizing national economies necessarily implies an increase in cultural
diversity is essential in order to increase cultural acceptance among host societies. Secondly,
education curricula should reflect these efforts by intensifying intercultural awareness. Thirdly,
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the contact between host societies and the Middle Easterners should be fostered through cultural
exchange programs in order to decrease xenophobia. Adopting all these measures will then lead
to the fourth element – dispelling populist claims.
Once these measures are adopted, a more united view on refugees and immigrants in
general should be formed. Moreover, EU member states should be able to better cooperate and
handle any immigration-related matters more effectively. Cooperation within the EU is essential,
especially since many diverse countries are involved. Therefore, appreciating its heterogeneity,
but also having a same objective, is important for the EU in order to recover from the chaos that
the refugees have created, and avoid similar situations in the future.
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